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SOME PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS OF A POST-
APARTHEID CONSTITUTION FOR SOUTH AFRICA
Sammy Adelman*
I. Introduction
In February 1990, after decades of internal resistance and international
sanctions, the Nationalist Government in South Africa finally acknowl-
edged that the demise of apartheid is inevitable by unbanning the African
National Congress (ANC) and other anti-apartheid organizations, and
releasing Nelson Mandela. It is hoped that during the coming months the
main protagonists will hammer out a constitution consigning apartheid to
the rubbish heap of history. It is not, however, inevitable that political
liberation will be accompanied by economic emancipation, and, as has
been the case elsewhere in the Third World, South Africa may be subjected
to a form of neo-colonialism.1
The abolition of the legal forms of apartheid is a necessary but
insufficient condition for correcting the massive inequalities between the
races which are the legacy of more than 300 years of racial discrimination,
and particularly the forty-two years of apartheid. 2 Similarly, the passage
of progressive legislation will not by itself be sufficient to bring about a
more equitable redistribution of wealth and resources. Nonetheless, leg-
* Lecturer in Law, University of Warwick School of Law, Coventry, England.
1. See Stoneman & Suckling, From Apartheid to Neocolonialism, 9 THIRD WORLD Q., April
1987, for a discussion of the possibility of apartheid evolving into neo-colonialism, the term for
which I will use in this paper being neo-apartheid. The ANC/SACP alliance has long argued that
South Africa has been subjected to "colonialism of a special type" (H. WOLPE, RACE, CLASS AND
APARTHEID STATE, (1988); SOUTH AFRICAN COMMUNIST PARTY, SOUTH AFRICAN COMMUNISTS SPEAK,
Inkululeko Publications (1981)), a theoretical formulation which has been severely criticized. All
references to neo-apartheid in this paper therefore refer to the possibility of continued white and
imperialist domination, particularly of the economy, despite the fact that the majority exercises
political power.
2. Apartheid has been described by some writers as racial capitalism in order to emphasize
the fact that it is based upon capitalist relations of production in which racialism has been a
predominant influence. See, e.g., J. SAUL & S. GELB, THE CRISIS IN SOUTH AFRICA (1986). It is
precisely for this reason that the repeal of racist legislation alone will not bring about a more
equitable distribution of wealth and resources.
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islation will play a key role in the country's future and no piece of
lawmaking will be more important than South Africa's first postapartheid
constitution. Unfortunately, in the euphoria which has surrounded recent
events there has apparently been little appreciation of the numerous
obstacles to be surmounted, particularly the contradictory nature of the
constitution-making process.
True liberation must mean that the different races, classes, cultures
and ethnic groups of South Africa forge a pluralist society in which all
citizens are able to participate fully and equally in political, economic,
social and cultural life irrespective of race, color or creed. As we shall
see, however, the Government and monopoly capital are advocating
constitutional mechanisms designed to decentralize power in ways which
will prevent the emergence of a pluralist participatory society, their goal
being to ensure that the ceding of political power does not undermine
white economic hegemony in a system of neo-apartheid.
This paper analyses the contradictions underpinning the forthcoming
negotiations in order to explain why a liberal bourgeois constitution is
the likely outcome and what the implications of such a constitution might
be. I begin by outlining some of the factors determining the context in
which negotiations will take place and then examine the demands of three
of the main protagonists. I then discuss two of the issues likely to dominate
the negotiations: political decentralization and the role of a bill of rights.
Finally, I look at the likely effect of the constitutional outcome on one
important section of South African society, the non-racial trades unions.
II. Constitution-Making in the South African Context
The fact that South Africa's first post-apartheid constitution will be
the result of a process of negotiation means that it will essentially comprise
a series of compromises between the aspirations of the black nationalism
represented by the ANC and the residual desires of Afrikaner Nationalism
as represented by the Government.3 As Nelson Mandela has argued: "You
need a compromise on fundamental issues. If you are not prepared to
compromise, then you must not enter into or think about the process of
3. While the ANC and the Government will not be the only parties to negotiations, no
agreement can be reached without their consent. This is not to imply that they are fully representative
of all viewpoints on the political spectrum. The Government, for example, is increasingly alienated
from the hardline Afrikaner Nationalists to its right. What I am acknowledging is the fact that these
two parties have either the greatest power or support, or both.
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negotiation at all." ' 4 There are, in addition, at least four other reasons
why the constitution will be a compromise.
The Balance of Forces
First, neither side has won the war in South Africa because it is a
war which neither side can win. As the Americans found in Vietnam, the
British in Ireland and the Israelis in Palestine, it is difficult to vanquish
a guerilla army. Despite the rise of black trade unions, the successes of
the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) - which replaced the banned
United Democratic Front - and the effects of international sanctions,
white South Africa retains enormous power, and UmKhonto we Sizwe,
the armed wing of the ANC, has neither the resources nor the firepower
to overcome the strongest military force on the continent. The outcome
of the liberation struggle has thus been to propel both sides to the
negotiating table. The ruling Afrikaner Nationalist Party has chosen to
negotiate now because it understands that doing so from a position of
relative strength is the only remaining way of securing any semblance of
white wealth and privilege; the ANC is willing to negotiate because the
abolition of apartheid is finally on the agenda. The balance of class forces
in the present conjuncture is therefore such that neither side can dictate
to the other. In the long term, through intensified military struggle and
an economic war of attrition, the black majority would triumph in a war
which would ensure the destruction of both the material basis of white
privilege and the potential for black economic advancement.
The South African Economy
Second, the new constitution will be a compromise because of the
present plight and uncertain future of the South African economy. The
cost of waging war throughout the sub-continent and the effects of
economic sanctions have undoubtedly been decisive factors in bringing
the apartheid regime to the negotiating table.' Since 1985, when the
Government was forced to declare a partial debt moratorium after foreign
banks refused to grant new loans, there has been a net capital outflow
of R30bn. A structural adjustment program, in which privatization plays
4. Reuter, Johannesburg, 16 Feb. 1990.
5. The Washington-based Investor Responsibility Research Centre (IRRC) estimates that
sanctions have cost South Africa between $15bn and $27bn and that the economy is 20 to 35 percent
smaller than it would have been in the absence of sanctions, particularly restrictions on capital inflow
and expensive import substitution strategies (Financial Times Survey (London), 11 June 1990, at 2).
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a pivotal role in bringing down government spending, has been imple-
mented - inevitably to the detriment of the black majority - and it will
be interesting to see the extent to which current fiscal discipline is
maintained in the face of the inevitable attractions of trying to buy off
the ANC.
Disparities between white and black remain huge, despite a decade of
"reform." Per capita expenditure on black education (excluding capital
spending) was R765 in 1988-89, against R3,082 for whites, while health
spending was $137.84 for blacks and R.597.11 for whites. 6 Housing
constitutes an even more urgent problem: The Urban Foundation calculates
that nearly half of all African families are housed in shacks and the
National Building Research Institute has calculated that 3.2 million housing
units would have to be constructed at an average of 200,000 per year if
every black South African is to be housed by the end of the century.7
According to Servaas van den Berg, an economist at Stellenbosch Uni-
versity, the cost of abolishing fiscal apartheid (introducing parity between
black and white benefit levels) in the fields of education, health and
housing would be approximately R75bn, more than the whole of the 1990
budget.8
Economic growth was negative during the first half of 1990, and even
the most optimistic forecasts predict growth of no more than 0.5 percent
for the year as a whole. The potential for social and political unrest can
be measured by the fact that growth of at least 4 percent is essential if
(black) unemployment is to be stabilized at its current high levels, and
this cannot be achieved without foreign capital. 9 It is a problem for the
ANC because it limits the scope of their control and intervention as the
new government, and a problem for the existing government because it
limits the range of its options going into constitutional negotiations.
Despite these problems, the economy remains the key to a successful
transition to a post-apartheid society, and the key actors inevitably have
differing views about its direction in the future. The Government and big
6. Hospitals have now been desegregated, but this does not necessarily mean that expenditure
has been equalized.
7. SOUTH AFRICAN BUILDER, Sept. 1986.
8. Unless otherwise stated, the information in this paragraph is derived from the Financial
Times Survey (London), II June 1990.
9. South Africa does not qualify for World Bank assistance (which, given the insanities of
that organization's structural adjustment programs, may in fact be a blessing) because per capita
income is too high; because of its balance of payments surplus it does not qualify for assistance
from the IMF; and because Eastern Europe is likely to provide stiff competition when it comes to
other sources of capital.
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business seek to maintain capitalist relations as the bedrock of continued
white privilege. The ANC, which has not yet clearly defined its position,
seeks a mixed economy with at least a modicum of nationalization as the
means of bringing about a redistribution of wealth and resources. 0 Despite
their differences, both sides need each other: White confidence must be
maintained if white capital and skills are to be retained and foreign
investment to return, while the historic inequalities of apartheid must be
ameliorated if stable growth is to be possible.
Table I
ECONOMIC INDICATORS 1988 1989
Total GDP ($m) 87,993 89,409
Real GDP growth 3.7% 2.0%
GDP per capital ($) 2,451 n/a
Current account balance ($m) 1,272 1,595
Budget deficit as percentage of GDP 4.4% 1.5%
External debt as percentage of GDP 24.1% 23.0%
Debt services/exports 9.6% 8.9%
Exports incl. non-factor services ($bn) 22.4 24.3
Imports incl. non-factor services ($bn) 17.2 18.8
Trade balance ($bn) 5.2 5.5
Export volume growth rate 5.7% 9.5%
Import volume growth rate 22.5% 1 0.0%
Inflation 12.90o 14.70o
Source: EIU, Reserve Bank Quarterly,
Survey (London), 11.6.90.
reproduced in Financial Times
Eastern Europe
The third reason why the new constitution will be a compromise is
the changed international environment brought about by the accession to
power of Mikhail Gorbachev in the Soviet Union and the consequent
10. 1 am assuming that the ANC, which enjoys the support of an overwhelming majority of
blacks and progressive whites, will be one of the two main protagonists along with the government.
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collapse of Stalinism in Eastern Europe. President de Klerk has admitted
that the rise of Gorbachev has facilitated negotiations by diminishing the
threat from this quarter perceived by the Government to exist.
More important, however, is the fact that centralized, planned eco-
nomic development has been discredited with the disintegration of Stalin-
ism in Eastern Europe. In turn, the statist constitutional conception which
has influenced so many socialist and African countries has been discred-
ited, leaving neo-conservative economic policies and liberal constitution-
alism in the ascendancy. The essentially liberal constitution which emerged
in Namibia is perhaps a reflection of these influences, as well as a potential
model for South Africa."
Events in the Soviet Union may, paradoxically, have one other effect
on constitutional negotiations. To a government in whose demonology
there has been little difference between the threats posed by communism
and the black majority, events in the Soviet Union may provide the
outlines of a desirable constitutional settlement. As we shall see, the white
ruling class is trying desperately to evolve mechanisms for the protection
of "group rights" (a euphemism for apartheid) based upon some form
or combination of federalism, confederalism or the Swiss canton system.
It would indeed be ironic if Gorbachev's moves towards greater confed-
eralism as a means of containing the centrifugal forces at work in the
Soviet Union provided the basis for the apartheid regime's thinking about
South Africa's future.
Civil Conflict
The potential for civil war is the fourth factor likely to impinge
directly upon constitutional negotiations. The transformation of South
African politics since February has simultaneously heightened black ex-
pectations and fuelled white fears. The threats come from three sources.
Most dangerous are the white neo-Nazis drawn primarily from the
white working class and farming communities, who correctly perceive the
end of apartheid as a direct threat to their material privileges. 2 Brain-
washed for four decades into believing that they have a divine right to
11. Nelson Mandela has praised Zimbabwe for its achievements since independence and referred
to it as a possible model for South Africa.
12. The emergence by the 1970s of an Afrikaner bourgeoisie through National Party control
of the state initiated the breakup of traditional Afrikaner Nationalism. It is this more affluent and
educated section of Afrikanerdom which, responding increasingly to the logic of capital rather than
the ideology of apartheid, has presided over reform and the move to negotiations.
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the land and that all blacks are either communists, terrorists or savages,
they have threatened to launch a Boerevryheidsoorlog (Boer freedom war),
a threat not to be taken lightly. They have formed paramilitary units and
have begun to resort to terrorism. With significant numbers in the police
and the military, they have access to arms and ammunition and appear
to be willing to fight to the death in defence of racism and their demand
for a white state. 3 The ability of the Government to control or coopt
these groups may have an important bearing on the outcome of negotia-
tions, not least because the ANC may be forced into concessions in order
to placate them.
A threat is also posed by what might be termed the black right, led
by Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, head of the KwaZulu bantustan and standard-
bearer for those who desire the retention of untrammeled capitalism in
which the only significant difference would be the color of the faces of
the oppressors. Buthelezi has attempted to play both ends against the
middle by participating in the bantustan system while courting the ANC,
and has readily resorted to tribalism and coercion in order to build and
reward his constituency. 14 He commands significant support, though prob-
ably far less than the numbers he claims. In the mid-1980s Inkatha
launched what amounts to a civil war in Natal against the followers of
the ANC and the MDM.'5 The conflict between Buthelezi and the ANC
has been simmering for years, and will continue to do so to the detriment
of South Africa as a whole unless it is definitively resolved.
A threat of a different nature is posed by the masses of militant youth
in the townships who have led the resistance to apartheid on the streets.
They are committed to the ANC but are unlikely to be satisfied with a
compromise constitution in terms of which they are required to wait for
the fruits of liberation. The longer negotiations take and the more the
ANC is seen to compromise, the greater will be the anger and impatience
of these urban blacks. This may give rise to a crisis of expectation which
some will attempt to resolve through violence.' 6 Alternatively, they may
13. Arms stolen from military installations have been discovered. These have presumably been
used in attacks on black civilians which these groups have claimed responsibility for (The Guardian
(London), 11 July 1990).
14. While four of the six "independent" homelands have committed themselves to supporting
the ANC in constitutional negotiations, Buthelezi continues to assert his claim to a national constituency.
15. The ANC's response to Buthelezi has been contradictory since Mandela's release. On the
one hand, overtures have been made in an attempt to bring him on board; on the other hand, a
full-scale attempt to crush Inkatha appears to be in progress.
16. One of the most unfortunate aspects of apartheid is the generations of disenfranchised,
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transfer their support to other groupings, the most likely beneficiaries
being the South African Communist Party (SACP) or (less likely but not
impossible) the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), thus undermining the
ANC's position at the negotiating table. 7
If the ANC's decision to virtually terminate the armed struggle does
not yield results quickly, and the Government cannot control the neo-
Nazis which apartheid has fostered, the tensions in South Africa could
become explosive. Given these realities, along with the models provided
by neighboring Zimbabwe and Namibia, South Africa's first post-apart-
heid constitution is likely to be essentially liberal and bourgeois in char-
acter.S
III. The Positions of the Main Protagonists
The prospects for pluralism and democratic participation in post-
apartheid South Africa are thus dependent upon the success of the main
protagonists in the negotiations in achieving their goals. Apart from the
ANC and the Government, groups such as the PAC (despite its current
stance), the SACP, the trades unions, Inkatha, the neo-fascist white and
other parties in the racially-based tricameral parliament will all lay claim
to seats at the negotiating table. The following section examines the
positions of three of the most important groups, the ANC, the Govern-
ment, and monopoly capital.' 9
disenchanted black youth who have been subjected to the violence of a system which has, in effect,
educated them into believing that this is the only way of resolving problems. The amount of violence
in South African society is appalling, and is a legacy of apartheid which may take generations to
eradicate.
17. The PAC does not enjoy widespread support, and its refusal to countenance negotiations
runs counter to the prevailing mood. However, its stance on issues such as land - which it demands
must be returned to the black majority - may well win it support in the future should the ANC be
seen to be conceding too much. Already the desanctification of Nelson Mandela (which the Government
hoped would occur as he became an actor in the real world once more) has proceeded to the point
at which he is regarded as a legitimate target of criticism.
18. The Namibian Constitution, which has been described as the most liberal in Africa, does
not contain a Bill of Rights. Rather, Chapter 3 outlines fundamental human rights and freedoms.
Article 21 of that Chapter guarantees freedom of speech, the press, thought, conscience and belief,
freedom of religion, assembly and association, the right to strike, to move freely throughout the
country, and to leave and return to Namibia. Citizens are entitled under Article 78 to a fair trial
from a judiciary which shall be independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law.
19. It is unlikely that monopoly capital will sit at the table in any overt guise such as Anglo-
American or the recently formed South African Chamber of Business. Instead the views, demands
and desires of big business are most likely to be represented by the small white liberal Democratic
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The ANC
For the ANC the writing of a new constitution is a necessary but
insufficient condition for the ending of apartheid: The "removal of
discriminatory laws and eradication of all vestiges of the illegitimate regime
are ... not enough; the structures and institutions of apartheid must be
dismantled and be replaced by democratic ones." 20 Its Constitutional
Guidelines contain an implicit recognition of the dangers of neo-apartheid
in arguing that "steps must be taken to ensure that apartheid ideas and
practices are not permitted to appear in old forms or new" and it calls
for "a rapid and irreversible redistribution of wealth."
The document calls for the firm protection of the human rights of all
citizens with equal rights for all irrespective of race, color, sex or creed
and demands "the entrenching of equal cultural, linguistic and religious
rights for all." It abjures the concept of "group rights" advocated by
the Government on the basis that this would perpetuate the apartheid
status quo and mean that the majority would continue to be constitution-
ally and politically exploited. It demands that South Africa "be an
independent, unitary, democratic and non-racial state," the government
of which shall be elected "under a system of universal suffrage based on
the principle of one-person one-vote." All political parties will have the
right to organize and take part in political processes, other than those
advocating racism, fascism, nazism or the incitement of ethnic or regional
exclusiveness, which would be excluded by law. The Guidelines call for
the inclusion of "a Bill of Rights [which] shall guarantee the fundamental
human rights of all citizens irrespective of race, color, sex or creed, and
shall provide appropriate mechanisms for their enforcement." The dem-
ocratic state shall guarantee "basic rights and freedoms, such as freedom
of association, expression, thought, worship and the press. Furthermore,
the state shall have the duty to protect the right to work, and guarantee
education and social security."
The major question facing the ANC is how to achieve a constitutional
settlement compatible with the demands contained in the Freedom Charter
Party, until the last whites-only election the official opposition in the white chamber of parliament.
The reason for including the views of capital in this section is that its influence on the future
economic wel-being of South Africa is likely to be significant even if its ability to affect the outcome
of constitutional negotiations is less so.
20. AmcAN NATIONAL CONORiESS OF SouTH AFRICA, CONSTITUTIONAL GUIDELINES FOR A
DaMOCATC Sotrm AFiuCA (1988).
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in a context in which compromise is inevitable.2' One example of the
difficulties to be confronted is the issue of land. The abolition of apartheid
and the collapse of the bantustan system will mean that 87 percent of the
population will no longer be legally confined to the 13 percent of land
which simply cannot sustain them. Many of these people are likely to
drift towards the cities in search of employment, but economic stagnation
means that they will be unable to find work. The obvious solution might
be to expropriate white-owned farms and resettle Africans on the land
which was historically theirs, but this - apart from the political ramifi-
cations - raises the problem that Zimbabwe has not yet successfully
solved, namely that modem farming methods and economies of scale
ensure that white farmers are generally more productive and the last thing
the first post-apartheid government would wish to do would be to spend
foreign currency on food imports.
The Government
Government thinking on a new constitution has so far stipulated the
need for regular elections, a ban on one-party rule imposed by "unso-
phisticated majority vote," a free market economy, jobs in government
for minority leaders and guarantees that people will be able to live in
their own communities. There should be state funding for racially exclusive
schools and no expropriation of property without compensation. The
Government wants to promote strong, relatively small, local government
units that control their own schools, police and other municipal services.
Whites would not only run their own local affairs on the basis of "group
rights," but would command resources, from an infinitely wealthier tax
base, that would enable them to maintain their separate and privileged
way of life. In this way the Group Areas Act and Bantu education could
be perpetuated in other forms.
Capital
It was the Anglo-American Corporation, the giant of the South African
economy, that, in the person of Gavin Relly, may be said to have broken
the logjam in white politics by visiting the ANC in Lusaka in 1985. In a
recent publication, "Anglo-American, Its Associates and South Africa,"
the Corporation argues (in a chapter entitled "Corporate Citizenship")
21. For a discussion of the Freedom Charter see section 5, Wit!ra. See R. SurrwN & J. CaoNiN,
TraTY YwARs op nm FaUnom CHAaRmt (1986), for a more extensive discussion.
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that "South Africa must move towards being a prosperous, non-racial,
multi-party democracy" and that "a high degree of individual economic
freedom is characteristic of prosperous societies. This is most clearly
expressed in the freedom to acquire private property. Other features
include a broadly based and non-punitive tax system, sound fiscal policy,
prudent management of the money supply and the proper recognition of
the power and place of the market in allocating economic resources." 22
This is not so much a call for the retention of the status quo, which
has become increasingly contradictory for capital, but rather for a laissez-
faire system in which state intervention is reduced to an absolute minimum.
The recently formed South African Chamber of Business (SACOB)
has published a Charter of Economic, Social and Political Rights which
we shall examine in greater depth below. In a statement accompanying
the publication of the Charter SACOB asserts that it "is in business to
create a climate of opinion in [South Africa] in which companies can
operate efficiently and profitably for the benefit of all" - apparently
forgetting capital's historic failure to mitigate the grossest inequalities of
apartheid. Obviously a response to the influence of the Freedom Charter,
SACOB's document signals monopoly capital's intention of influencing
the constitutional negotiations through a bill of rights essentially bourgeois
in form and designed to perpetuate minority power by de-emphasizing
race while intensifying the existing class distinctions arising from apartheid.
Capitalists have thus realized, no doubt with Zimbabwe in mind, that
the ceding of political power to the black majority does not necessarily
constitute an insurmountable barrier to the retention of a free enterprise
system and capitalist relations of production because white skills, capital
and confidence will be essential to the return of foreign investment
confidence and hence to future development. Monopoly capital is therefore
advocating a constitution which entrenches free enterprise, capitalist re-
lations of production, the rule of law, a separation of powers, an
independent judiciary and a bill of rights - primary among those rights
being that of owning private property. As we have seen, most of these
demands are common to both the ANC and the Government. Where big
business differs from the Government, and both of them from the ANC,
is on the question of decentralization.
22. ANoLo-A~mcAN Coo o TON OF SouTH AFRICA, ANoLo-AmERICAN: ITS ASSOCIATES AND
SouTH AFICA 27 (1990).
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IV. Decentralization
As we have seen, the ANC (along with virtually every other represen-
tative black political organization of any significance, apart, possibly,
from Inkatha) is demanding universal adult suffrage in a unitary state.
Freedom of religion, language and culture in a bill of rights are regarded
as sufficient protection for any minority. The ANC is not opposed to
decentralized political power in principle, but what it will not accept are
constitutional mechanisms for devolving political power which would
effectively amount to a disguised form of apartheid.
There has long been a tension in state policies between centralization
and decentralization. 23 Separate development was premised upon the "de-
centralization" of political power to the bantustans and the decentrali-
zation of economic activity to the white-controlled areas bordering them.
The former failed because it was both illogical and genocidal, the latter
because it confounded the logic of the market. "Total Strategy," P.W.
Botha's version of "reform," also had dual and contradictory goals. On
the one hand it aimed to incorporate blacks in more effective local
government organs in an attempt to foster a black buffer middle class
and thereby deflect political demands away from the center. On the other
hand, it involved a massive centralization of power in the hands of the
central state through the State Security Council system and State of
Emergency powers. The latest attempt by the Government to maintain
apartheid takes the form of a demand for "group rights." Gerrit Viljoen,
the Minister for Constitutional Development, has argued that minorities
must be protected by a charter of human rights and by constitutional
provisions ensuring participation in political decision-making, and by
measures granting autonomy to minorities and political regions. 2 In
Woollacott's words, the Government seems
to want some recognition of whites and other ethnic groups under the
less offensive label of 'cultural affiliation' to be constitutionally
embodied. That would seem to point towards a bill of rights for
minorities, and towards mechanisms like entrenched seats or rules
under which parliamentary candidates would have to secure a proportion
of the votes of each racial group to win a seat. 25
Monopoly capital's proposals are more subtle but ultimately lead to
a similar position. Anglo-American disingenuously claims that "it is not
23. See S. Adelman, THE Cists nt SOuTH AIUCA, Ch. 3 (Pluto, forthcoming).
24. Reuter, Cape Town, 9 May 1990.
25. Woollacott, South Africa: The New Apartheid, The Guardian (London), 22 Feb. 1990.
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the role of business in general, or Anglo in particular, to write constitutions
or create political processes,''2 6 and then proceeds to celebrate the role of
one of its employees in producing a booklet published by the Corporation
entitled "Shaping the Future: A citizen's guide to constitution-making" 27
in which Godsell discusses decentralized political power. He argues that
in a centralized system of government power is concentrated in a few
institutions and although some functions of government may be delegated,
"the authority of the central institutions remains supreme and subject to
very few restraints. In a decentralized system ... power is divided and
devolved to a range of regional or local institutions which exercise full
or partial authority over their respective areas. In this way, they act as a
check on one another."8
The dangers of neo-apartheid are reflected in SACOB's Charter, which
mirrors the Government's concern to promote neo-apartheid through
strong local government units in which whites would maintain a large
degree of political autonomy. SACOB's support for this position is evident
in its affirmation of a strong belief in, inter alia, a market economy and
economic growth, private property, and cultural and minority rights. 29
Cultural and minority rights are fleshed out in Sections 19 and 20 of the
Charter:
19. The form of any new constitution shall be the subject of
negotiation between interested parties, and it is essential that
any future political system in South Africa provides:
19.1 the necessary checks and balances;
19.2 the safeguard of basic human rights;
19.3 protection for minorities against domination.
20. The State shall not be above the law, but shall, through
decentralization and devolution of state powers, be close to the
people and responsive to their needs.
The Charter is silent as to what form protection for minorities against
domination should take, but given the historic relationship between Anglo-
American and the liberal Democratic Party, we may assume that some
form of federalism or confederalism is envisaged.
26. ANOLO-AMERICAN CORPORATION OF SOUTH AFRICA, supra note 22, at 27.
27. B. GODSELL, SHAPING A FUTURE FOR SOuTp AFRICA: A CITIZEN's GUIDE TO CONSTITUTION-
MAKING, (Cape Town, 1990).
28. Id. at 49 (emphasis added).
29. H. PARSONS, INTRODUCTORY COMME NTS ON THE SACOB CHARTER OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL
AND POLICAL RIOTS IN SOUTH AFRICA 4-5 (1990) (emphasis added).
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The ANC cannot compromise on the demand contained in the Freedom
Charter for universal suffrage in a unitary state. If the Government is to
lead the white right peaceably into a new South Africa it will have to
assuage their fears. The two positions are apparently incompatible, but a
system of proportional representation which maximizes the value of white
votes may form the basis of a compromise, one of many which will have
to be struck.30
V. A Bill of Rights
Two years ago, Albie Sachs noted that "argument about a Bill of
Rights in post-apartheid South Africa is beginning to rage.'", Today,
most of the major political actors agree that the new constitution should
contain a bill of rights. The ANC advocated such an instrument as early
as 1988; SACOB issued its Charter in May 1990, and the Government-
appointed Law Commission came out in favor of the idea in June.
Agreement in principle is, however, the only thing which these groups
have in common thus far.
There are two basic approaches which can be taken towards a bill of
rights. The first is traditional, limited, and potentially reactionary and is
that adopted by the Government and big business in their attempt to
institute neo-apartheid. The primary objective of a bill of rights would
be "to protect the existing and unjustly acquired rights of the racist
minority rather than to advance the legitimate claims of the oppressed
majority.''32 Godsell not surprisingly disagrees:
The purpose of a Bill of Rights is to ensure the necessary degrees of
freedom for all citizens to join or form political parties, articulate and
debate political aspirations, and engage in peaceful political activity.
At the same time this concept is designed to protect public order
against political violence. Surely this instrument - if supported by a
political culture which makes it more than a piece of paper - holds
the promise of reconciling freedom and order in a way that will make
debate about future constitutions both possible and constructive. Perhaps
the first debate should be about the Bill of Rights.3"
30. It may be argued that the proportional representation has the further advantage (depending
upon the threshold laid down) of providing most of the diverse political groups in the country with
representation in the parliament thereby reducing the potential for extra-parliamentary resistance from
either extreme.
31. A. SACHS, TowARDS A BILL OF RioHns IN A DEMOCRATIC SouTH AFRICA 1 (1988).
32. Id. at 4.
33. B. GODSELL, supra note 27, at 47.
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Another, more progressive conception is that propounded by Albie
Sachs on behalf of the ANC, which regards a bill of rights "as an
instrument for enlarging the freedom of the oppressed majority, thereby
creating a South Africa in which equal rights become a reality and in
which the whole population, irrespective of color or origin, can live in
peace and with dignity." -1 He argues for the inclusion of Second and
Third Generation rights, which relate to the material needs of citizens,
because it would be perverse to restrict a bill of rights to First Generation,
predominantly bourgeois rights, and that it would "be grossly anachro-
nistic to start post-apartheid South Africa with a Bill of Rights document
as archaic (even if not as vicious) as the system it is designed to replace." 3s
One of the problems which has bedeviled rights theory is that of
defining who is entitled to enforce a particular right. Take for example
the right to development, a so-called Third Generation right predicated
upon the entitlement of every human being to basic human dignity and
progress. Leaving aside the vexed question of what this right may in fact
consist of, a major problem in asserting its existence is deciding whether
it is a right to be exercised by the state, by a collective, or by individuals.3
The dilemma facing the ANC is that the bourgeois legal form, structured
as it is to promote individualism and protect private property, is likely to
be contradictory to the goals of a more just and equitable South Africa.
No matter how progressive the content of a bill of rights is it will founder
on the rocks of bourgeois legality unless the contradiction between indi-
vidual and collective rights can be resolved.
To date, the ANC has not published a draft bill of rights. However,
its Constitutional Guidelines contemplate the possibility that a bill of
rights might in effect be a collection of different charters (with the
Freedom Charter as the foundation) reflecting the demands of different
sectors of society. 7 Such a document would have the advantage of being
fundamentally democratic, and would constitute an interesting attempt to
34. A. SACHS, supra note 31, at 3.
35. Id. at 6.
So-called First Generation rights are bourgeois in origin, being derived from the French and
American Revolutions and are codified in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
of 1966. Second Generation human rights were inspired by the Russian Revolution and are contained
in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966. Third Generation
rights, largely embodied in the still somewhat nebulous concept of the right to development, are
inspired by decolonization and the struggle of Third World countries to develop.
36. See S. ADELmAN, THE Rm io DEVBWPmBNT: Paomads AND PoTEmALs (1989). and 1.
Smvn, Tan CoNcEPT op Hum" RboHrs i AnuCA (1989).
37. For a discussion of a Workers' Charter see Section 7, infra.
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underplay the individualism inherent in the bill of rights concept by
providing substantive material rights. There would, however, also be would
be several potential disadvantages, not least would be a bourgeois system
of enforcement. This eventuality would be inevitable unless a fundamental
restructuring of the legal system is contemplated. This knotty issue is
unlikely to be confronted by a democratically elected government in the
immediate future. A further problem might arise in deciding which social
groups would have the right to have their charters incorporated in the
bill of rights.
As we have seen, the ANC regards provisions for freedom of language
and for cultural and religious freedoms in a bill of rights as sufficient
protection for any minority. This may well be so, but not perhaps for
the reasons envisaged by the ANC. The enforcement of a bill of rights
by courts in an unreconstructed bourgeois legal system with a separation
of powers and an independent judiciary is, theoretically, all that the white
minority requires in order to maintain its economic ascendancy and should
render any talk of group or minority rights irrelevant. Entrenched clauses
in a bill of rights appended to the constitution which sanctify private
property and regulate the means of nationalization and expropriation with
compensation will do more to make neo-apartheid possible than all other
mechanisms put together. And if, as seems likely, there are clauses
guaranteeing freedom of language and religion, Afrikaners should be able
to maintain their lifestyle and protect their culture with relatively little
difficulty.38
Once again, we have the basis for a flawed, contradictory compromise.
By protecting individual rights, such a constitution would guarantee ma-
jority rule, but at the cost of accepting a legal form which places private
property at the centre of the universe and is hence inherently unprogressive.
The protection of individual rights makes redundant the need to protect
group rights, because individuals secure in their property and able to
freely associate can exercise those rights in order to maintain their cultural
or ethnic identity. After apartheid, such a bill of rights might be regarded
as the lesser of two evils, and it is likely that this is what South Africa
will get.
38. I am not arguing against the rule of law, separation of powers or an independent judiciary,
much of which I favor and which it would be foolish to abjure in light of recent events in Eastern
Europe and elsewhere, such as Kenya and Zambia. Rather, I am trying to point out that bourgeois
legality is contradictory in that while it may well provide procedural constraints upon state power, it
is a legal form structured to facilitate capitalist exploitation.
A POST-APARTHEID CONSTITUTION FOR SOUTH AFRICA 135
There are in existence two documents designed to form the basis of
a bill of rights: the Freedom Charter passed by the Congress Alliance in
1955 and SACOB's Charter of Economic, Social and Political Rights
published in 1990.
The Freedom Charter was adopted at the Congress of the People in
Kliptown, Johannesburg on 25-26 June 1955 and was the outcome of an
extensive process of consultation throughout the country. Possibly the
most democratic document ever formulated in Africa, it has been the
ideological foundation of the liberation struggle, particularly during the
decades in which the peoples' leaders were either in prison or in exile. It
demands that the people shall govern; all national groups shall have equal
rights; the people shall share in the country's wealth; the land shall be
shared among those who work it; all shall be equal before the law; all
shall enjoy equal human rights; there shall be work and security; the
doors of learning and culture shall be opened; there shall be houses,
security and comfort; and there shall be peace and friendship.
SACOB's Charter contains some constitutional prescriptions but is
essentially an embryonic bill of rights. Apart from its prescriptions for
the protection of minority rights through decentralized power structures,
it is largely unexceptionable and limited. The Preamble states the organ-
ization's belief that "the optimal wealth creation for the benefit of all is
best achieved through a market economy," and section 21 calls for the
entrenchment of "economic freedom and the private enterprise ethic" in
any new constitution. The Charter is preoccupied with the free market
system, individual rights, and private property ("everyone has the right
to own property" and cannot be deprived of it "without due process of
law and compensation" - section 1). It does not, however, confine itself
to representing essentially bourgeois or "First Generation" rights. Ac-
knowledging the realities of apartheid's fate in the current global context,
the Charter reflects, rather belatedly, a willingness to act as a catalyst for
propelling South Africa towards the twenty-first century, into which the
rest of the world is preparing feverishly to enter. To this end, Second
Generation rights - that is, social, economic and cultural rights-are also
included.
Part I consists of a statement of Economic Rights and Principles and
provides that there shall be equal work opportunities, free choice of
employment and fair remuneration, freedom of contract and equal pay
for equal work, as well as the right to form and join trade unions (section
3). However, the Charter omits the right to strike provided in Article
8(l)(d) of the 1966 UN Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
and does not contemplate a right to work.
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The Social and Cultural Rights envisaged in Part II consist of respect
for private and family life, freedom of thought, conscience and religion,
and rights to equal education, freedom of language and to participate in
the cultural life of the nation. The right contained in section 8.1 of "a
person belonging to an ethnic, religious or cultural grouping" to "use his
own language" would, on face value, appear to be unexceptionable;
indeed, the ANC has indicated its agreement with such a position. This
provision can be interpreted either altruistically, as a genuine attempt at
promoting a multi-ethnic non-racial society, or more cynically, as agree-
ment with the Government's concept of "group rights." While there can
be no disagreement in principle about protecting the right of people to
use their own language, it is precisely such a clause which might provide
the basis for neo-apartheid in the form of exclusively white schools with
Afrikaans as the medium of instruction.
Part III lays down SACOB's desired Civil and Political Rights, which
provide that all shall be equal before the law, and prohibits arbitrary
arrest, detention without trial, torture, slavery and servitude. It calls for
freedom of movement, opinion and expression, freedom of association
and peaceful assembly. Incitement of racial, national or religious hatred
shall be prohibited by law.
The final and briefest part of the Charter covers Personal and Public
Responsibilities, and includes the right of the State to take action in
accordance with the law to defend itself during times of public emergency.
This ominous sounding provision is a common constitutional mechanism,
appearing for example in Chapter 4 of Namibia's constitution.
At face value, then, much of the Charter is consistent with many of
the demands of the ANC and the Mass Democratic Movement. However,
the aim of monopoly capital is primarily to entrench existing disparities
in economic power, and to reduce to an absolute minimum the amount
of state-directed restructuring necessary to begin correcting the ravages of
nearly 350 years of racial discrimination. It is important to emphasize
that the predominant thrust of the Charter is in favor of individual rather
than collective rights and to secure the reign of the Rule of Law, with
all people having "the right to recognition as a person before the law,"
equality before the law without discrimination, the right to life, liberty
and security of person, and no arbitrary deprivation of these rights. Once
again, much of this would be unexceptionable - at least in the absence
of bourgeois legality.
VI. The Contradictions of Liberal Constitutionalism
One of the effects of the collapse of Stalinism has been to emphasize
the ascendancy of the liberal democratic constitutional conceptions over
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the statist ones associated with the Soviet bloc. Liberal constitutional
models are characterized by their emphasis on limited and ostensibly
accountable government and on individual rights. On these two pillars
other structures are erected, such as periodic elections; a separation of
powers; the rule of law; an impartial and independent judiciary; and
procedural rights commonly enunciated in a bill of rights. 9 At face value
such a conception is desirable, embodying as it does many of the freedoms
underpinning the recent revolutions in Eastern Europe. However, as Engels
noted and history has proved, it is the bourgeois democratic form of state
which is most likely to throttle progressive aspirations, for "it is precisely
the democratic republic which is the logical form of bourgeois rule."' 4
The rule of law, for example, is predicated upon the ostensible
neutrality of the state in conflicts between classes, interest groups and
individuals. Power must be achieved in a constitutional manner and must
be employed neutrally: Economic might or claims of privilege must be
ignored. The laws, among which the constitution is preeminent, thus
determine who should hold political power and how it can be exercised.
A constitution will specify procedures for the creation of all other laws,
which must be public, capable of being readily understood, and enforced
according to their obvious meaning. No person may arrogate to her/
himself the power to ignore them or to dispense with due process. Indeed,
the Rule of Law insists that the legal procedures be followed even when
this inconveniences the dominant class. Citizens must be able to exercise
their respective rights with the confidence that the courts will uphold
them.4' A concrete example is provided by SACOB's Charter which, in
section 22, demands that "the institutions of democratic government, and
in particular, the separation of state powers, the independence of the
judiciary and the supremacy of the law, the freedom of the press and the
free formation of political parties shall be the foundation of South African
statehood. "
The problem with the bourgeois law, and with the Rule of Law in
particular, is that it is more concerned with form than with substance; it
privileges individualism at the expense of the collective, and it fetishizes
law. Thus, apparent formal equality before the law disguises and ignores
39. I. Smvn, STATE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AFRICA: A NEW DEMOCRATIC PERSPECTIVE
[Paper presented to the African Regional Institute of the American Council of Learned Societies,
Comparative Constitutionalism Project] 3 (1989).
40. ENOELS, Letter to Bernstein, 24 Mar. 1884 in K. MARX & K. ENOELS, SELECTED
CORRESPONDENCE 350 (Moscow, 1975).
41. H. COLLINS, MARXISM AND LAW 136 (1982).
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substantial social inequalities. While formal equality of bourgeois law
would certainly be an improvement on the apartheid legal system, the
danger is that a de-racialized post-apartheid constitution will ultimately
form the basis for a more subtle form of class domination. By refusing
to take substantive issues into consideration, bourgeois legal systems are
able to pull off the vital trick of granting preeminent protection to private
property, and hence to capitalist social relations as a whole. It is therefore
the bourgeois legal form upon which capital's constitutional proposals are
necessarily predicated, and the bourgeois legal form must at least be
contained if liberation is not to be confined to the shell of majority rule.
VIl. Workers and Constitutional Change42
This section analyses some of the problems which are likely to arise
in the relationship between one important section of South African society
and a post-apartheid government, that of the non-racial trades unions. In
making a prognosis, I draw upon the experience of Zimbabwean workers
during a decade of independence, and the shorter but no less relevant
experience of workers in Namibia. It is of course not certain that South
African trades unions will experience similar problems, but comparisons
between these states are nonetheless apposite for two reasons. First, all
three economies are dominated by the apartheid regime and, in particular,
by Anglo-American. In addition, all three have faced British colonialism
and South African neo-colonialism to one degree or another. Second, the
traditions of struggle and the relations between the liberation movements
in all three countries bear striking resemblances, particularly as far as the
ANC and SWAPO are concerned.43
One of the main differences between unions in South Africa, Zim-
babwe and Namibia is their size. The Congress of South African Trade
Unions (Cosatu) was formed in 1985 with a membership of more than
500,000 and 33 affiliated unions. Despite this impressive figure, Cosatu
is only one of several trade union groupings in South Africa, representing
42. This section is derived from a paper presented to the Annual Conference of the Canadian
African Studies Association in Halifax, Nova Scotia, 9-12 May 1990.
43. It is true that the Angolan and Mozambiquan struggles and political economies also have
the ravages of apartheid in common. On the other hand, the nature of the MPLA and Frelimo
liberation movements was somewhat different, given that their immediate struggle was against
Portuguese colonialism. It is for this reason that comparisons are confined to South Africa, Namibia
and Zimbabwe.
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a total black work-force of nearly seven million." Between 1979 and 1985,
union membership increased six-fold, from 70,000 to half a million and
has continued to do so every since. In Zimbabwe, union membership
trebled from 57,000 to 170,000 during the same period despite far more
favorable conditions. In Namibia, the National Union of Namibian Work-
ers (NUNW) represents about 100,000 workers in a total population of
1.5 million - approximately one in every seven adults. 45
Labor and the State in Post-Colonial Societies
Nationalism has been a factor common to many social and political
struggles against dependent capitalism or direct colonialism. It is a unifying
ideology which brings cohesion to a disparate coalition of subordinate
classes and potential ruling classes. However,
when nationalism achieves its objectives - usually the consolidation
of a unified nation-state - the social contradictions of the nationalist
movement tend to sharpen. As the nationalist regime is consolidated,
it will act as any other dominant class, albeit with some secondary
contradictions with imperialism .... On the one hand there is a
tendency towards state incorporation of labor (corporatism) under the
mantle of legitimacy provided by nationalism and, on the other hand,
the labor movement may be the "power behind the throne" of the
new nationalist regime.46
In Africa, many unionists have been conscious of the need to maintain
a power base independent of the nationalist movement even when they
were basically in accord with the broad political objectives of that move-
ment. 47 This has certainly been the case in South Africa and Namibia
although, as we shall see, unions in Zimbabwe have suffered from
corporatism. Throughout the continent, governments have chosen to deal
with the "labor issue" in different ways, but this has almost always
culminated in the government taking over labor organizations. 4 This has
led Munck, for one, to argue that "only autonomous working class
44. In 1986 the economically active African population was 6.7 million, excluding the Transkei,
Venda, Bophutatswana and Ciskei bantustans. The figures were 324,000 for Asians, 1.13 million for
Coloureds and 2.12 million for whites (ANNuA. SURVEY OF RACE RELTIONS - Part 2, 1986, South
African Institute of Race Relations, 717-18 (1988)).
45. M. Verbaan, Namibian Unions: Not Quite There, WoRK IN PROGREss 64 34 (1990).
46. R. MuNCK, THE NEW INTERNATIONAL LAB oR STUDEEs 265 (1988).
47. R. CoHEN, LABOR AND PoLrrncs 243-44 (1984).
48. Id. at 252.
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organizations can represent workers' interests consistently in any 'part-
nership' with Third World nationalist regimes." 4 9
Whether South Africa remains capitalist, moves towards a mixed
economy, or undergoes socialist transformation, the famous "trade union
debate" in post-revolutionary Soviet Union has
demonstrated the continued importance of trade unions under socialism
to express the basic social and economic interests of workers. Yet in
practice "actually existing socialism" has stripped trade unions of their
class role and converted them into "transmission belts" to take party
directives down to the masses .... There is, in short, no alternative
between, on the one hand, a genuinely organized workers' power and,
on the other, a bureaucratic state socialism which will steadily develop
its own elite class and claw back the gains of the revolution."
Labor and the State in Zimbabwe"'
According to the ZANU PF government of Robert Mugabe, the period
since independence in Zimbabwe has been one of socialist transformation.
This corresponds to the "two-stage" theory adhered to by the ANC/
SACP alliance. Zimbabwe, according to Mitchell, has been seen in many
quarters as a model for a democratic South Africa, despite the fact that
the two liberation struggles have taken very different forms . 2 This raises
some interesting questions.
An article entitled "The Second Phase of the Revolution" in ZANU
PF's official organ in July 1983 examined the role of workers in Zim-
babwe's liberation struggle and, after noting that foreign investors were
required to aid in the country's development, concluded that "co-operation
between the workers and employers in economic activities of the country
is essential." This attitude, that economic development requires a disci-
plined, peaceful work-force which is not helped by strong, independent
unions, has underpinned the government's attitude towards the labor
movement since independence. The Zimbabwe government "has sought
to maintain a favorable business climate and encourage foreign investment,
and has waged a relentless campaign against strikes and taken a range of
49. R. MUNCK, supra note 46, at 167.
50. Id. at 178.
51. This section is based on B. Mitchell, The State and the Workers Movement in Zimbabwe,
12 S. APR. L.a. BuLL., August-September 1987. See also B. Wood, Roots of Trade Union Weakness
in Post-Independence Zimbabwe, 12 S. AnR. LAB. BuLL., August-September 1987.
52. B. MTCHELL, supra note 51, at 104.
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measures intended to prevent the emergence of a truly independent union
movement." 3
This might be taken as a warning to the South African labor movement
of what an avowedly socialist government is capable of upon the as-
sumption of power. However, the history of the Zimbabwe labor move-
ment is crucial to an understanding of the relative weakness of trade
unions in the post-independence period. The history of Zimbabwean
unions runs roughly parallel to that of the unions in South Africa up to
the early 1960s; but unlike the unions in South Africa, those in Zimbabwe
remained largely non-political during the peasant-based liberation struggle
and, although the working class was not passive, a combination of state
repression and bureaucratic leadership kept the unions weak. Whereas the
resurgent unions in South Africa in the 1970s had learned the lessons of
their history and built democratic structures based upon the shop-steward
movements and were thus better placed to resist state repression, the
unions in Zimbabwe succumbed first to repression and then to corpora-
tism.
What may well be replicated in South Africa is the attitude of a new
government beset by the myriad problems of development. Soon after
Independence in 1980, the ZANU PF government went so far as to argue
that "large strikes should not be permitted in developing countries since
the social costs of disruption were too high. ' 5 4 What is also likely to be
similar in South Africa is the inheritance of a set of deep structural
economic problems which encourage attempts to co-opt, control or dom-
inate the labor movement "in the national interest." In Zimbabwe, the
Labor Relations Act of 1985 introduced, inter alia, controls over unions
through compulsory registration and certification; gave the Minister of
Labor wide powers to fix wages and intervene in union affairs; provided
for a complex and bureaucratic dispute settlement procedure and an
effective ban on strikes; and made contravention of the legislation a
criminal offence. In South Africa, the recent Labor Relations Amendment
Act constitutes an attempt on the part of the state and monopoly capital
to claw back many of the gains won by workers' struggle since the 1970s,
and to bureaucratize and dull shop-floor resistance.
Mitchell concludes that
It]he winning of Independence in Zimbabwe has given workers definite
gains.... But the capacity for further reforms in an economy faced
53. Id. at 105.
54. Id. at 108.
THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUDIES-1989
with deep structural problems is very limited. The increase in living
standards after Independence, a product of the workers' own struggle,
has already been reversed. The theory of a steady transition to socialism
through capitalist growth together with an expanding state sector is a
complete illusion. Instead, workers will be compelled in future to
struggle against capital and the state to defend what they have."
Zimbabwean workers have achieved minimum wage laws and controls
on dismissals; they have also been subjected to "wage freezes and price
rises, thousands of job losses (100,000 jobs were lost in commercial
agriculture [in the period] 1980-1985), and laws banning virtually all
strikes."5, 6
It is not beyond the realms of possibility that workers in South Africa
might find themselves in a similar position. Granted, unions in the
Republic are far more powerful, and the gains they have made during
the past decade will prove far more difficult for capital and the state to
erode. Perhaps the real lesson is that workers in South Africa can
ultimately rely on nobody but themselves.
Labor and the State in Namibia
No sooner had negotiations for Namibian independence begun, than
the workers in that country discovered that liberation did not necessarily
imply the satisfaction of all their demands. Despite having been a loyal
ally of SWAPO during the liberation struggle, the powerful NUNW was
frustrated in its demand that all of its fifteen "fundamental rights and
freedoms" be included in the new Namibian constitution.7 This may have
been due to the fact that SWAPO was forced to compromise on consti-
tutional issues through not having secured the two-thirds majority neces-
sary to dominate the Constitutional Assembly, but it certainly brought
home to the Union that it would in future be forced to rely upon its own
organisational strength as its most reliable guarantee of workers' rights.
The NUNW is committed to a socialist economy, the struggle for
which is likely to be all the more difficult in the light of the liberal
constitution adopted and the mixed economy which the new government
appears to favor. A further key objective is the establishment of a
powerful, unified, free and democratic trade union movement independent
of any internal or external domination and influence by political forces.
55. Id. at 121.
56. Hall, Zimbabwe: The Gulf Widens, 14 S. AnR. LAB. BuLL. 60 (1990).
57. The substance of this section is derived from M. VERBAAN, supra note 45.
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Time will tell whether the inevitable flexing of union muscles in Namibia
will lead to controls and repression similar to that experienced in Zim-
babwe and other newly independent developing countries. The Union
insists that workers' interests are paramount, and that it will maintain its
independence; it vows that it will not be dictated to by any Namibian
government.
The new Namibian constitution entrenches the right of free association
and the right to strike without fear of criminal prosecution - themselves
rights which have been denied to workers in many other countries in
Africa. However, several other rights demanded by the Union, including
the right to a living wage, are not included in the constitution but rather
in the constitution's "principles of state policy," which represent a state-
ment of intent rather than entrenched and legally enforceable rights.
These principles also include a commitment to "the active encourage-
ment of the formation of independent trade unions to protect workers'
rights and interests, and to promote sound labor relations and fair
employment practices" and a commitment to join the International Labor
Organization (ILO) and to adhere to its international labor standards.
The NUNW was clearly unhappy at the failure of its full set of
fundamental rights to be included in the constitution, and feared that the
granting of those rights which do not appear in it would now be dependent
upon the whim of the state. Among the full set of demands made by the
NUNW were the right of recognition of trades unions by all employers,
including the state; the right to strike; the right of all to work; the right
to proper training and education for workers; and the application of
United Nations' Decree Number One - that the natural resources of
Namibia belong to the people of Namibia.
The Prospects for Workers in South Africa
The ANC has often been accused - usually by ultra-leftists with little
understanding of the nature of the struggle - of being a petty bourgeois
organization. The ANC was, until it was unbanned and began to face the
problems of operating as a political party, a national liberation organi-
zation, which was at once its biggest virtue and its biggest vice. It was a
virtue because as a liberation organization it proved to be remarkably
successful in building and consolidating a non-racial multi-class alliance
against apartheid. It was a vice because the multi-class nature of the
organization inevitably meant a dilution of the socialist principles which
are arguably essential for true liberation.
As negotiations unfold, the resolution of issues like nationalization -
a key demand contained in the Freedom Charter - will provide indications
THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUDIES-1989
of how a black government will juggle the necessities of economic devel-
opment, the maintenance of white skills, and the demands of the black
working class.5 8 There is growing agreement among unions on the need
for a Workers' Charter, with the aim of having it incorporated in the
new constitution. The SACP has published a draft Charter,59 while Cosatu
resolved at its third Congress to consult its membership on the issueA°
SACTU, which decided to effectively merge with Cosatu, has also pub-
lished a draft Workers' Charter which, inter alia, includes demands for
the right to work; for full freedom of trade union activity; the right to
freedom of movement, speech and assembly; for workers to be able to
live with their families; equal opportunities for all workers; the right to
strike; an eight-hour working day; non-discrimination against female
workers; and full political rights.6' There have also been calls for the right
to picket to be included in such a Charter. 62
The confidence of South African workers in making such calls results
from rapid union expansion since the early 1970s and the numerous gains
which they have been able to enforce against the apartheid regime. They
have "successfully forged a central place for [themselves] in South African
liberation politics" and the
kind of union movement which emerges, as well as the system of
industrial relations that is presently being struggled over, will provide
the framework for the relations between capital and labor well into
the future. The struggle to define the future is taking place within
structures inherited from the past. The labor movement is clearly at
the crossroads: capital and the state could succeed in containing it, or
labor could continue playing a leading role in internal resistance to
apartheid. The implications of unbanning the political movements for
labor's role in the negotiating process remains to be seen. 63
More germane to this paper is the question of whether capital and
particularly the state will be able to contain labor in a post-apartheid
South Africa.
58. Already the ANC is talking of nationalization as something of a "last resort" and indicating
that it is only certain sections of monopoly capital which it has in mind. Walter Sisulu, interviewed
on Whose Shall Be the Land? (BBC Radio, 1 May 1990).
59. See S. APR. LAB. Buu.. 14(b).
60. R. Roux, Workers Charter Campaign, 14 S. AnR. LAB. BULL. 29-30 (1990).
61. Id. at 30-31.
62. Patel, The Right to Picket Facilities: A Workers' Charter Demand, 15 S. AFR. LAB. BULL.
75-6 (1990).
63. Leger & Webster, Labor at the Crossroads, 5 S. An. REV. 254-5 (1989).
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The ideological differences which beset Cosatu during the first eighteen
months of its existence resolved themselves in the form of a strategic
compromise during the state onslaught against anti-apartheid organizations
in 1987 and 1988. One of these ideological differences was over the
relationship between the workers' movement and the liberation struggle.
This issue came to the fore when a Cosatu delegation visited the ANC in
Lusaka in February 1986, leading some within the shop-floor tradition in
the federation to argue that this identification with the national-democratic
struggle was problematic in that this tradition stood in absolute contrast
to working class politics. "Organisational style and political content were
such, it was argued, that any involvement of the working class in such
politics must lead to the surrendering of trade union independence and
with it the abandonment of working class politics.""
One example of the "strategic compromise" reached within the move-
ment was the adoption of the Freedom Charter by several of Cosatu's
leading affiliates, leading general secretary Jay Naidoo to comment that
"the struggle for socialism is already unfolding within the struggle for
national liberation." Cosatu adopted the Freedom Charter as "a guiding
document which reflects the views and aspirations of the majority of the
oppressed and exploited in our struggle against national oppression and
economic exploitation. '" 66 However, the National Union of Mineworkers
(NUM) resolution which led to the adoption of the Charter noted that
Cosatu viewed these struggles as "complementary to each other and part
of an uninterrupted struggle for total liberation.''67 Interestingly, the then
exiled South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU), which is closely
affiliated to the ANC, sent a telegram to Cosatu's second Congress in
July 1987, stating that the struggle for socialism should not be a priority
at that stage.
In adopting this approach, the dominant position in Cosatu was
rejecting any chronological two-stage theory of change in favor of a view
that the struggle for national liberation was part of the struggle for
socialism. Indeed, it was asserting that there is no contradiction between
the struggles for socialism and national liberation." At Cosatu's first
64. Fine & Webster, Transcending Traditions: Trade Unions and Political Unity, 5 S. APR.
Riv. 261 (1989).
65. Jay Naidoo on COSATU, interview in 12 S. Am. LA. BuLL. 5 (1987).
66. Quoted in Fine & Webster, supra note 64, at 262.
67. Carrim, Cosatu: Towards Disciplined Alliances, Woa IN PiouRxss 49 (1987). quoted in
Fine & Webster, supra note 64, at 263.
68. Fine & Webster, supra note 64, at 263.
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Congress Cyril Ramaphosa, general secretary of the powerful NUM, stated
that "the struggle of workers on the shop floor cannot be separated from
the wider struggle for liberation.''69 At its third Congress, Cosatu reaf-
firmed its belief in the leading role of the working class in the struggle
for democracy and socialism, and its commitment to the strategic alliance
between the federation and the United Democratic Front (as it then was),
the latter's policies being closely aligned with those of the ANC. It also
resolved that the trade union movement should retain its independence
and decision making structures. 70
According to Fine and Webster,
the necessity of forced unity has not removed the differences underlying
the competing political traditions. Implicit in this broad-front conception
of unity is the view that class contradictions are secondary to the
national democratic struggle. In a post-apartheid society these class
contradictions are likely to come sharply to the fore as the new state
embarks upon the task of national development. Trade unions which
emphasize their representative role by struggling to defend and improve
members' working conditions could easily be seen as opponents of the
new state's attempt at national development. 7'
They go on to make the point that "attempts to limit the role of
trade unions in post-colonial Africa have often been justified on the
grounds that trade unions represent only a tiny fraction of the labor
force. Compared to the mass of unemployed living below subsistence,
workers organized in trade unions are regarded as a privileged labor
aristocracy.' '72 All governments are of necessity forced to balance the
competing demands of all groups in society, and must do so within a
limited set of resources. In southern Africa, every national liberation
movement which has come to power has done so after a struggle in which
a commitment to socialism has played some part. In Zimbabwe, socialism
appears to have been stillborn; in Namibia the signs are not promising,
and in South Africa only time will tell. Treading a thorny path towards
majority rule, and facing complex economic problems when it comes to
power, the new government may not have workers' demands at the top
of its list of priorities.
69. SOUTH AFRIcAN INSTITUTE OF RACE RELATIONS, ANNUAL SURVEY OF RACE RELATIONS 1985
180 (1986).
70. 14 S. Ant. LAB. BULL. 3 (1989).
71. Fine & Webster, supra note 64, at 272-3.
72. Id. at 273.
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The history of workers' movements and trade unions throughout much
of post-colonial Africa - indeed, throughout much of the less developed
world - indicates that it is essential that South African unions retain
their independence and decision making structures and that they remain
as democratic as possible, if for no other reason than to be able to
withstand the possible cooptation and opportunism of some union leaders.
Even these, however, will not guarantee the realization of their demands
and the protection of workers' rights. Conflict between labor and the
state in post-apartheid South Africa is almost inevitable, given the under-
lying structural crisis in the political economy and the rash of competing
demands likely to face the new'administration. Historically, workers have
made and consolidated gains only through class struggle, and the situation
is unlikely to be different in South Africa. As for the future of socialist
struggle, only time will tell. What is certain is that this struggle will have
to be elevated from the level of rhetoric and will manifest itself in forms
of conflict which may not be to the taste of the new state.
According to Munck, "it is a general phenomenon that socialist states
strive to develop industrial production in the belief (disputed by some)
that this is the key to modernization and development. ' 73 The rationale
commonly put forward by the governments of less developed countries
- often self-styled socialist administrations who practice totally contra-
dicts their rhetoric 4 - for subordinating trade unions is that overall
economic development is in the interests of all citizens and that trade
unions cannot be allowed to act against this national interest. As Marx
argued, "the emancipation of the working classes must be conquered by
the working classes themselves. '75 Munck asserts
[t]his means that no elite group, however well intentioned, can substitute
for the active and conscious participation of the working classes. It is
not merely an abstruse sociological debate to consider the class make-
up of Third World revolutions, and in particular the role of the urban
working class. It is even more important to consider its role once state
power has been seized by the revolutionary forces. If the working
class is not fully engaged in running a society at all levels, it is simply
not socialism according to basic Marxist criteria. The final point...is
73. R. MUNCK, supra note 46, at 179-180.
74. Recent events in Eastern Europe have, hopefully, finally laid to rest the idea that democracy
can or should be subordinated in order to achieve socialism. Socialism is meaningless in the absence
of democracy.
75. Quoted in R. MuNcK, supra note 46, at 181.
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that of democracy. Socialism cannot be forced; if it is not democratic,
it is not socialism.76
VIII. Conclusion
Apartheid is a form of capitalist production in which racial discrimi-
nation has played a predominant role. 77 The removal of the formal legal
manifestations of racism is, therefore, a necessary but insufficient con-
dition for the true liberation of the black majority. The problem, in other
words, is not simply one of racial discrimination but rather that of a set
of social relations of production in which race has heretofore been
definitive. Abolishing the Population Registration Act will not provide
the fifth of the African population living in shacks with houses.
It would thus appear logical to conclude that not only must the racial
aspects of capitalism be swept away, but that ravages of the capitalist
side of the equation need to be addressed as well. Contrary to the views
of the Government, monopoly capital and Western imperialism, capitalism
in South Africa is very much part of the problem rather than a potential
solution. The legacy of Eastern Europe and the realities of South Africa
today dictate that some form of welfare state with a mixed economy is
the least that is required if racial capitalism is not to metamorphose into
neo-apartheid. Even this, however, is unlikely to be enough.
Our study of South African workers illustrates some of the difficulties
and contradictions which may lie in the path of transition to a post-
apartheid society. We have seen, for example, that the major contradiction
facing the labor movement in South Africa is that while democracy is
essential to the achievement of its goals, a bourgeois democratic system
might well be the very thing which makes the realization of those goals
difficult to attain. The labor movement has played and continues to play
an important role in the struggle to destroy apartheid and transform
South African society, but workers' demands, though important, are only
one set among many. Liberation will come to South Africa, but it is
likely to bring with it an intensification of other contradictions: between
labor and the national liberation movement, labor and capital, and labor
and the new state. The struggle for socialism, for a genuinely pluralist
and participatory democracy, will probably have to begin in earnest on
the day that apartheid is finally buried.
76. Id. at 181-2.
77. For a discussion of the relationship between race and class see S. ADELMAN, supra note
23, and H. WowE, supra note 1.
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